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KUHLMANN v. WILSON:* THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
GOVERNMENT CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH
SURREPTITIOUS INTERROGATION
The sixth amendment1 guarantees to an individual accused in a
criminal prosecution the right to assistance of counsel.2 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amendment to prohibit the Government from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from an accused 3 after the right to counsel has attached.' In
* 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the United States
Supreme Court for the first time found a limited right to counsel essential to due
process in some criminal cases. Id. The Powell Court stressed that "notice and hearing" were "basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law."
Id. at 68. The concept of "hearing," in turn was the basis of inferring the need for
legal representation. Id. As Justice Sutherland explained in Powell:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him.
Id. at 68-69. Accord Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to counsel
of one charged with a crime is deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials). See
also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (counsel is essential to communicate
demands and commitments of sovereign to the citizen); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (the obvious truth is that the average defendant does not have the legal
skill sufficient to protect himself).
3. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the Court held
that the defendant was denied the basic protections of the sixth amendment when
the government used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating statements, which federal agents had deliberately elicited after defendant had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Id. at 206. See also Maine v. Moulton, 106 S.
Ct. 477 (1985) (the sixth amendment imposes an obligation on prosecutor and police
not to act in a manner that circumvents the right to counsel); United States v. Henry,
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Kuhlmann v. Wilson,5 the United States Supreme Court addressed

the issue6 of whether the sixth amendment right to counsel is violated when the government places an informant in a cell with the
accused to passively listen for incriminating statements.7 The Wilson Court held that merely placing an informant in the defendant's
cell does not violate the sixth amendment.' The sixth amendment
447 U.S. 264 (1980) (the government violates the sixth amendment when it intentionally creates a situation likely to induce a defendant to make incriminating statements
in the absence of counsel); Brewer 430 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the State
cannot be permitted to dishonor an individual's effective representation by counsel).
4. The Supreme Court has held that under the protection of the sixth and fourteenth amendments, a person is entitled to the assistance of counsel at or after the
time judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398.
Thus, the right to counsel is not limited to participation in the trial itself. The right
attaches at earlier stages in the criminal proceedings, where absence of counsel might
"well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) quoted in United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S.
180, 189 (1984). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The Supreme Court has
observed that once the government decides to prosecute, the adverse positions of the
government and defendant have solidified. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180,
189 (1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 289 (1972)). Therefore, the right to
counsel attaches at the time the accused is arraigned. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 469-70 (1981); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398.
5. 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
6. The Court first addressed a threshold issue of whether it would serve the
ends of justice to entertain a second habeas corpus petition which raised a sixth
amendment claim decided adversely to the defendant on a prior petition. Wilson, 106
U.S. at 2621-22. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). In Sanders, the
Court had advised federal district courts to dismiss successive habeas corpus petitions
if the "ends of justice" would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent
application. Id. at 15-17. Although a majority of the Wilson Court could not agree as
to the correct standard for the availability of federal habeas corpus relief, six members did agree to deny defendant's habeas corpus petition on the merits. Wilson, 106
U.S. 2616 (per Powell, J., with Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J., concurring, with White and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in result). A plurality of the Court
suggested that district courts may entertain successive habeas corpus petitions only
in those instances where the prisoner can make a colorable showing of factual innocence. Wilson, 106 U.S. at 2627 (per Powell, J., with Burger, C.J. and Rehnquist and
O'Connor, J.J., joining). It is beyond the scope of this casenote to thoroughly examine
the Court's analysis of the habeas corpus issue. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). For a discussion of the history and purpose of federal habeas corpus relief, see generally
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64
MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966).
7. In a previous case involving a similar sixth amendment right to counsel issue,
the Supreme Court anticipated but did not decide the question of whether placing a
"listening post" in a cell to record incriminating admissions violates the right to
counsel. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 n.9 (1979). In a footnote to the
majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger observed that the Henry case was not such
that "we are called upon to pass on the situation where an informant is placed in
close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged." Id. See infra note 25.
8. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2628. There is no sixth amendment violation when a
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does prohibit, however, the police and their informant from acting
in some manner, beyond merely listening, which is deliberately
designed to elicit incriminating remarks.9
In 1970, Joseph Allan Wilson and two accomplices killed an onduty dispatcher while committing an armed robbery of the Star
Taxicab Garage in the Bronx, New York."0 After his arrest and arraignment on charges stemming from these crimes," the police
placed Wilson in a jail cell' 2 with another prisoner, 3 who, unknown
to Wilson, was a police informant. Wilson initially denied any involvement in the crimes,"' but eventually made incriminating statements which the informant reported to the police.' 5
passive listening device collects incriminating information, since such an instrument
cannot lead a conversation or prompt a reply. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563
F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (held no sixth
amendment violation where government used an electronic device to secretly record
the defendant's conversation with a friend).
9. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
10. Id. at 2619. Just before the murder, three Star employees saw Wilson, who
had worked at the garage approximately a year and a half earlier, and two men, conversing in the garage. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2619
(1986) (No. 84-1479). The three witnesses, who later identified Wilson from photographs, saw Wilson run from the dispatcher's office carrying money in his arms. Brief
for Petitioner at 3. As Wilson ran past, he said: "Keep cool. I've left something on the
floor for you." Id. One of the witnesses then looked into the dispatcher's office and
saw the body of Sam Reiner lying on the floor amid scattered money. Id.
11. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619. Wilson surrendered himself four days after the
crime when he learned the police were searching for him. Id. A Detective Cullen immediately arrested Wilson and advised him of his fifth amendment rights. Brief for
Petitioner at 7, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2619 (1986) (No. 84-1479).
12. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619. The police transferred Wilson from his original
cell to another that directly overlooked the Star Taxicab Garage, the scene of the
crime. Id.
13. Id. Just prior to Wilson's arrest, Detective Cullen arranged for an inmate at
the Bronx House of Detention to act as an informant. Brief for Respondent at 3,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986) (No. 84-1479). Detective Cullen had
known the inmate for five years and had previously employed him as an informant.
Id. Cullen told the inmate that he would arrange for Wilson's transfer to his cell. Id.
Cullen instructed the inmate to "see if he could find out" the names of the two accomplices, but not to question Wilson. Id.
14. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619. At the time of his arrest, Wilson told Detective
Cullen that he was at the scene of the crime while looking for his brother who was
employed there. Brief for Respondent at 3, Kuhlman v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616
(1986) (No. 84-1479). Wilson told Cullen that he had fled from the scene for fear of
being blamed. Id.
15. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619. When Wilson looked out the cell window, he
immediately became upset by the view. Brief for Respondent at 4, Kuhlman v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986) (No. 84-1479). His first words to the informant were:
"Somebody's messing with me because this is the place I'm accused of robbing." Id.
Once Wilson had begun the conversation about the crime, he told the informant essentially the same story he related to the police. Id. Although the informant did not
question Wilson, he said: "Look, you better come up with a better story than that
because that one doesn't sound too cool to me." Id. Over the course of the next ten
days in the same cell with the informant, Wilson gradually changed his story until he
admitted to planning the robbery and killing the dispatcher with two other men. Id.
at 5. The informant supplied Detective Cullen with notes he had taken during the
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Prior to trial in New York state court, Wilson moved to sup-

press his incriminating remarks, on the grounds they were obtained
in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel." The trial
judge denied the motion, because the informant had obeyed police
instructions not to question Wilson about the crimes, but only to
listen for the names of his accomplices. 7 In 1972, Wilson was convicted of common law murder and felonious possession of a
weapon."s In 1973, Wilson filed a petition in federal court for a writ
of habeas corpus, again raising a sixth amendment claim.' 9 The federal district court refused to issue the writ.20
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided United
course of Wilson's admission. Id.
16. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620. An evidentiary hearing was held to determine
the admissibility at trial of Wilson's admission to the informant, in accordance with
People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 (1965).
17. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620. The trial court found that Wilson's statements
were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited." Id. The trial court considered the significance
of this fact under state precedent which held that volunteered statements to police
agents were admissible, because the police were never required to stop talkative defendants from admitting their crimes. Id. See People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250
N.E.2d 329 (1969) (a defendant's spontaneous statements to police when advised of
his constitutional rights were admissible).
18. Wilson was sentenced to a term of twenty years to life on the murder conviction and to a concurrent term not to exceed seven years on the weapons count.
The state appellate court affirmed the convictions and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Wilson, 41 A.D.2d 903, 343 N.Y.S.2d 563
(1973).
19. The writ of habeas corpus was traditionally used to elicit the cause of commitment and to ensure adherence to proscribed procedures in advance of trial. See
generally CHURCH, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 2-30 (1884); 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104 (1926); WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); Collings, Habeas
Corpus for Convicts-ConstitutionalRight of Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV.
335, 341-61 (1952); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1 776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
243, 244-45 (1965). Today habeas corpus is primarily a means for one court of general
jurisdiction to exercise post-conviction review over the decision of another court of
like authority. See, e.g., Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners-CollateralAttach on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus-Post Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA. L.
REV. 461 (1960); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1956). The Supreme Court has previously held that federal district courts
have the power, on habeas corpus petition, to determine facts de novo on a subject
already considered by a state court. See, e.g., Roberts v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220
(1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226. F.2d 83 (9th Cir.
1955). The Court has also found in habeas corpus an appropriate remedy to challenge
a conviction which was obtained through a coerced confession. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963).
20. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on
reviewing the record found that there was no sixth amendment violation where the
defendant's statements were spontaneous. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978),
reh'g denied, 590 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979). Judge
Oakes dissented, arguing that the police investigory techniques used against Wilson
violated the Massiah deliberate elicitation standard. Id. at 1194-95. For a discussion
of deliberation elicitation standard, see supra note 3.
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States v. Henry"' on facts similar to Wilson22 and held inadmissible,
as a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, inculpatory
statements made to a paid jailhouse informant.2 3 In 1982, Wilson
filed a second habeas corpus petition in district court, claiming that
his original petition should be reconsidered in light of Henry.2 4 The
district court denied the second petition.2 5 On appeal, the court 2of6
appeals reversed the district court's denial of Wilson's petition.
The court found that, under Henry, Wilson was entitled to relief,
because the government violated his sixth amendment right to counsel by intentionally staging a scene that induced Wilson to make
incriminating remarks.
'
The United States Supreme Court, granting certiorari,28
re29
versed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court considered
whether placing a jailhouse informant in close proximity to the defendant, when the informant makes no attempt to stimulate conver-

21. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1979). In Henry, the Court identified
the circumstances under which the government circumvented the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel when it used an undisclosed informant to elicit incriminating statements from him. Id. at 270. "First, Nichols was acting under instructions
as a paid informant for the government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than
a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at
the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols." Id. The Court held that the
Government interfered with Henry's right to counsel when it intentionally created "a
situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel..." Id. Thus, the Henry Court found the defendant's statements
inadmissible. Id. at 274.
22. Virtually every court that compared Wilson with Henry has viewed the two
cases as indistinguishable. Henry, 447 U.S. at 281 (Blackmun and White, J.J., dissenting); Wilson v. Henderson, 590 F.2d 408, 409 (2nd Cir. 1978) (Oakes, J., dissenting); Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1978) (Russell, J., dissenting)
("certainly there can be no distinction drawn between this case and Wilson. In fact, if
anything, the facts in that case were more favorable to the defendant's claim than are
the facts in this case"); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 637-638 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (assertions "virtually identical").
23. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
24. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. Wilson sought to relitigate his sixth amendment
claim on the grounds that the decision in Henry was a new rule of law that should
retroactively apply to his case. Id.
25. Id. The District Court for the Southern District of New York distinguished
the Wilson case from Henry, thus finding it unnecessary to consider whether Henry
applied retroactively. Id. See supra note 24. The court noted that Wilson presented
the question reserved in Henry of whether the sixth amendment forbids admission in
evidence of an accused's statements to an informant, who made no effort to stimulate
conversations about the crime charged. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. See Henry, 447
U.S. at 271, n.9. The court concluded that the Constitution does not forbid admission
of evidence under such circumstances. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621.
26. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
3499 (1985).
27. Id. at 746-474. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found Henry and Wilson to be indistinguishable. Id.
28. 105 S. Ct. 3499 (1985).
29. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2622.
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sations about the crime charged, violates the sixth amendment.3"
The Court determined that the accused must demonstrate that the
police and their informant went beyond merely listening and took
some action which was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating
statements."1 The Court then concluded that since the trial court
had previously determined that the informant made no affirmative
effort to elicit information from Wilson,"3 the court of appeals erred
in its failure to accord those factual findings their required pre33
sumption of correctness.
The Court began its analysis with an examination of a line of
sixth amendment cases beginning with Massiah v. United States.3"
In Massiah, the Court held that once the sixth amendment right to
counsel has attached, a defendant is denied that right when federal
agents deliberately elicit incriminating statements from him in the
absence of counsel. 5 The Wilson Court noted that the primary aim
of the Massiah test is to protect a defendant from surreptitious investigative techniques that are functional equivalent of direct police
interrogation. 6 The Court then considered the Massiah test as it
was applied in United States v. Henry.3 7 Although the informant in
Henry did not question the defendant, he did stimulate conversa30. Id. at 2628. See supra note 7.
31. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630. The Court noted that "a defendant does not
make out a violation of that [sixth amendment] right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating
statements to the police." Id.
32. Id. For a discussion of the trial court's findings, see supra note 17.
33. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
In any proceeding instituted in Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by
a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant
for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced
by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written
indicia, shall be presumed correct. . .
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966) (emphasis added).
34. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
35. Id. at 206.
36. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629. The defendant in Massiah made the incriminating admissions to one of his accomplices, who had arranged to have government
agents listen over a radio transmitter. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. The agents told
the accomplice to "engage Massiah in conversation relating to the alleged crimes."
United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting in part).
The Massiah Court found that, under these circumstances, the government agents
secretly and deliberately elicited information from the defendant in a manner that
was equivalent to direct interrogation. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
37. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629. In Henry, the Court found that the informant
developed a feeling of trust and confidence with the defendant in order to engage in
conversations which were likely to induce incriminating statements. Henry, 447 U.S.
at 270. The Court held that the informant intentionally used his position to secure
the necessary information and thus violated the Massiah deliberate elicitation standard. Id. at 274.
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tions in order to elicit incriminating information which was held to
violate the sixth amendment." The Wilson Court emphasized that
the Massiah and Henry decisions were intended to restrict police
conduct which amounts to indirect and surreptitious interrogation
in the absence of counsel.3
The Wilson Court noted that the trial court made a factual
finding that Wilson's statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. 0 The Court reasoned that the conversations between the informant and Wilson were not the equivalent of interrogation, since
the informant had obeyed specific police instructions not to ask
questions." The Court thus concluded that, absent some form of interrogation, or its functional equivalent, the government did not violate Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel.2
Although the result of the Court's decision in Wilson may seem
equitable, considering the gravity of the particular crime involved,43
the Court's reasoning was deficient for two reasons which are inherently intertwined. First, in light of Henry, the Court's inordinate
emphasis on interrogation, in the sense of direct questioning, was an
overly narrow construction of the Massiah deliberate elicitation
standard.4 4 The Court failed to recognize that the standard in Henry
38. The Henry court observed that the informant prompted the incriminating
conversations through his "conduct and apparent status as a person sharing a common plight." Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
39. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630. The Court interpreted Henry to require a functional equivalent of interrogation before there is a sixth amendment violation. Id.
40. Id. at 2630-31. The Court criticized the Second Circuit's revising some of
the trial court's findings that Wilson's statements were voluntary.
41. Id. at 2630. The Court noted that Detective Cullen specifically instructed
the informant not to ask Wilson questions. Id. The Court interpreted these instructions as a "conscious effort" to protect Wilson's "constitutional rights [under Massiah] while pursuing a crucial homicide investigation." Id. at 2620, n.3 (quoting Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d at 1191).
42. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
43. On overturning the decision of the District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to
order Wilson's release unless the State chose to retry him. Wilson v. Henderson, 742
F.2d 741, 748 (2d Cir. 1984).
44. The Henry Court looked to the totality of the government's behavior rather
than, as in Wilson, focus only on whether the informant asked questions of the accused or stimulated conversations about the crime charged. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271.
The Henry court recognized the need to consider all the factors, physical and psychological, which the government may employ to obtain incriminating information without directly questioning a defendant. Id. at 273-74 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 448-54). On the subject of police interrogation, see generally C. O'HARE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, 102-03 (1st ed. 1956) (appeals to conscience and other psychological ploys are the constituents of which interrogation is
made). One of the categories of interrogation described in the manual is "Friendliness" which includes the subdivisions "The Helpful Advisor" and "The Sympathetic
Brother", each involving the subject's desire "to square things with his own conscience." Id. at 102. See generally Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of
Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968) (physical proximity leads to psychological proximity); Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes
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encompassed more subtle forms of interrogation, as in the present
case, where the state intentionally created a situation which was
likely to induce the accused to make incriminating admissions.4 5
Second, the Court's analysis is inconsistent with the original spirit of
Massiah.4' The Massiah test was intended to guarantee an accused
the right to legal representation at all stages of a criminal proceeding, regardless of whether the government interrogates him.4"
In examining the Wilson decision, it is necessary to first understand the history of the Massiah test.48 The Massiah test evolved
from the reasoning of two concurring opinions in Spano v. New
York.4 9 The concurring opinions in Spano held that a formally
charged person has a right to the assistance of counsel, and unless
he knowingly waives that right, the absence of counsel is sufficient
to exclude any resulting incriminating statements.50 Several federal
courts promptly adopted this reasoning. 51 The Supreme Court then
held in Massiah that once the sixth amendment right to counsel has
attached,5 2 the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating
statements from a defendant in the absence of counsel. 53 The Massiah Court recognized that the decisive factor was not whether the
defendant was interrogated, 5 4 but whether the government's conduct
Custodial Interrogation?,25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974); Kamisar, "Custodial Interroga-

tion" Within the Meaning of Miranda in

INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CRIMINAL

335 (1968); Rothblatt &
Pitler, Police Interrogation:Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go From Here?,
42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479 (1967).
45. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. See supra note 44.
46. The Massiah Court was not concerned with interrogation. Massiah, 377
U.S. at 206. In fact, the government never interrogated Massiah in the formal sense
of the word. Id. at 202-03. The Massiah Court was primarily concerned with preventing the government from circumventing an accused's right to counsel in any manner
once the right had attached. Id. at 206. See also Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter? 67 GEo. L.J. 1,
41 ("The Constitutional Irrelevance of "Interrogation" for Massiah Purposes").
47. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. See supra note 46.
48. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
49. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1958) (Douglas, J., with whom Black and
Brennan, J.J., joined, concurring) (Stewart, J., with whom Douglas, and Brennan,
J.J., joined, concurring).
50. Id. at 324, 327.
51. See, e.g., People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d
70 (1961) (admissions obtained from indicted defendant excluded when not made in
presence of counsel). See also People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (holding inadmissible any statement made after arraignment in
absence of counsel); People v. DiBrasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 160 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21
(1960); People v. Price, 18 App. Div. 2d 739, 235 N.Y.S.2d 390 (3d Dept. 1962); People v. Wallace, 17 App. Div. 2d 981, 231 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dept. 1962); People v.
Karneel, 17 App. Div. 2d 659, 230 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dept. 1962); People v. Robinson,
16 App. Div. 2d 184, 224 N.Y.S.2d 705 (4th Dept. 1962).
52. See supra note 4.
53. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
54. There was no interrogation in Massiah. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. Massiah was released on bail at the time the government elicited incriminating informaLAW AND THE CONSTITUTION-SOURCES

AND COMMENTARIES
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was intended to obtain incriminating statements from an accused in
the absence of counsel. 6
After Massiah, the Court recognized, in Brewer v. Williams,56
that government agents often employ subtle conversational techniques which are more effective in prompting incriminating statements than direct questioning."' In Brewer, the Court found that a
policeman's appeal to the defendant's religious convictions and
sense of guilt was tantamount to interrogation." In a concurring
opinion in Brewer, Justice Powell noted that the government successfully exploited an atmosphere that was conducive to psychological coercion."9
The Court's recognition of the psychological aspects of interrogation laid the foundation for its decision in Henry.60 In Henry, the
Court observed that an incarcerated person has a psychological inducement to seek support from those around him." The Court further noted that the stress of custody may subject an accused to subtle influences which will make him particularly susceptible to the
deceptions of undercover government agents.2 Finally, the Henry
tion from him. Id. See supra note 46.
55. As Judge Hays pointed out in his dissent in-the court of appeals, "if [the
rule advocated by the two concurring Justices in Spano and adopted by the New
York courts] is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse." United States v. Massiah, 307
F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1962).
56. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
57. Id. at 399-400. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell "jointed] the opinion of the Court which... finds that the efforts of Detective Learning 'to elicit information from William,' as conceded by counsel for [Iowa] at oral argument... were a
skillful and effective form of interrogation." Id. at 412.
58. Id. at 399-400. In Brewer, the defendant, an escapee from a mental institution, was suspected of murdering a young Iowa girl who had disappeared. Id. at 390.
Brewer, a deeply religious person, surrendered himself to the police in Des Moines.
Id. While driving the defendant some 160 miles to Davenport, Captain Learning engaged Brewer in conversation. Id. The detective addressed Williams as "Reverend"
and asked that the defendant think about the fact that the next day was Christmas
and that the weather was so bad it would be nearly impossible to find the girl's body
by the next day. Id. at 392-93. The detective then suggested that Brewer consider
that the young girl would not get a "decent Christian burial." Id. After giving the
matter consideration, Brewer confessed to the murder and led the detective to the
body. Id. at 393. The Brewer Court found that the detective's comments to the defendant were tantamount to direct interrogation because of Brewer's deeply religious
nature. Id. at 397-99.
59. Id. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1979). The Court noted that the informant had some conversations with the defendant and the incriminating statements
resulted from these conversations. Id. at 271. Similar to Brewer, the Henry Court
recognized that statements may be as effective as questions in eliciting information.
Id. See supra note 44.
61. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467
(1966)). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-54 (mere fact of custody imposes pressures
on the accused).
62. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. For list of references on various interrogation tech-
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Court concluded that the government intentionally created a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating admissions, thereby violating the sixth amendment right to counsel. 3
In Wilson, a case substantially similar to Henry,"' the police
placed the accused and an informant in a cell directly overlooking
the scene of the crime." Wilson became very upset when he looked
out the cell window." The court of appeals in Wilson suggested that
the cell placement was a governmental attempt to trigger incriminating remarks from the defendant.8 7 The cell placement may not
have been an intentional psychological ploy; nevertheless, it did induce Wilson to initiate a conversation about the crime." Once the
conversation was initiated, the informant commented that Wilson's
account of the crime was unconvincing." The informant further suggested that Wilson should think of a more believable story. 70 The
Wilson Court, however, failed to recognize this as an instance where
the government created a situation likely to induce incriminating
admissions. 71 Instead, the Court found this to be a "listening post"
situation, where the informant made no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.72
The Wilson Court erroneously relied upon the state court's factual findings that the informant in no manner interrogated the accused. 73 As Justice Brennan argued in his dissent, the state court
made its finding at a time prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Henry.74 Thus, the state court relied on state precedents, which it
niques, see supra note 44.
63. Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
64. See supra notes 21-22.
65. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619.
66. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals
noted that Wilson was immediately suspicious of his placement in a cell with a view
of the crime scene. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 15.
69. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra note 15.
The Supreme Court in Wilson did not view the informant's statements as prompting
incriminating admissions from the defendant. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
70. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals
found that these comments were intended to deliberately elicit a different and more
incriminating story from the defendant. Id.
71. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630. The Court found the situations in Wilson and
Henry were totally distinguishable.
72. Id. The Court's conclusion was contrary to the trial record where the informant's testimony indicated that he had urged Wilson to create a more believable
account of the crime.
73. Id. The Wilson Court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were
entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
74. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The state court relied
on a state precedent instead of the then available federal precedent of Massiah. Id.
See also People v. Kay, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329 (1969) (absent interrogation,
spontaneous statements made by suspects in custody who had not received the Mi-
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interpreted as requiring affirmative interrogation as a prerequisite to
a sixth amendment violation."
The court of appeals in Wilson observed that, as a matter of
law, the deliberate elicitation standard of Henry requires consideration of more subtle forms of eliciting admissions than affirmative
interrogation." The Court of Appeals did not disregard the state
court's factual findings,7 but realized that the old standard had
evolved, adding considerations not used at the time of Wilson's original hearing. The court applied the Massiah test, as clarified in
Henry, and concluded that Wilson did not present the listening post
situation, where the informant makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.78 Instead, the court found the Wil79
son case to be indistinguishable from Henry.
In Wilson, the Supreme Court failed to recognize a perfect example of the kind of situation which the Massiah decision was intended to prevent. The Court incorrectly concluded that the primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation
which is the equivalent of direct police interrogation."0 The only real
distinction advanced in Wilson is that the informant did not directly interrogate the accused.81
The government, however, had not interrogated Massiah.82 The
police merely instructed an informant to induce Massiah to talk. 3
randa warnings are admissible).
75. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2637 (Brennan J., dissenting). See also People v. Kaye,
25 N.Y.2d at 142, 250 N.E.2d at 331-32. Kaye was a case involving a claim of a fifth
amendment Miranda violation. Id. Under Miranda, there is a requirement to a fifth
amendment violation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The purpose of the
Miranda rule is to restrict coercive custodial interrogation. Id. The Massiah decision
required only the functional equivalent of interrogation for a sixth amendment violation. Thus, the state court interpreted the facts in Wilson's case under a misplaced
precedent involving a fifth amendment question, rather than the sixth amendment
right to counsel.
76. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984). See 447 U.S. at 274.
The Henry Court focused on the end result of the government's actions rather than
the means of obtaining that result. Id. Regardless of whether the actual means of
gathering incriminating statements is impermissible, there is a sixth amendment violation under Henry if the government creates a situation likely to induce an accused's
admissions. Id.
77. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals
expressly accepted the state court finding that the informant did not question Wilson. Id. The court held that, as a matter of law, the deliberate elicitation standard of
Henry extends beyond direct questioning to prevent more subtle forms of stimulating
incriminating statements. Id.
78. Id. at 747-48.
79. Id. at 747.
80. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
81. Id.
82. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 203. See supra note 46.
83. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 203. Arguably, in Wilson, the informant's suggestion to
the defendant that he had better change his story could have induced Wilson into
incriminating himself in the absence of counsel. Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741,
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The decisive factor was whether the police circumvented Massiah's
sixth amendment right.84 The Massiah Court focused on whether
the police conduct deliberately elicited information, and not on the
precise way in which it was obtained." Thus, the Wilson Court's
attention to the actual method of obtaining the incriminating information was misdirected." The Court should instead have questioned whether the police had interfered with the relationship between the suspect and his counsel after formal proceedings had
begun."7
Prior to Wilson, the sixth amendment protected the individual
from government actions intentionally designed to circumvent his
sixth amendment right to counsel."s The Court's decision in Wilson
allows the government to place a "listening post" in a defendant's
cell to record incriminating statements, as long as there is no attempt to encourage conversations about the crime charged. 9 In order to prove a constitutional violation, a defendant must show that
the police and their informant took some form of action deliberately
designed to elicit incriminating information in a manner that is the
functional equivalent of direct police interrogation.9
The precedential value of the Court's decision is significant. In
the future, sixth amendment right to counsel disputes will be resolved with a narrow construction of the Massiah deliberate elicitation standard. A narrow reading of the Massiah standard will
greatly expand the government's use of incriminating admissions at
trial which were previously held inadmissible. Although the Wilson
decision may respond to a public desire for a harder stance on
crime, the consequences of the Court's reasoning may serve to erode
745 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. In his dissent to the court of appeals majority holding against the defendant, Judge Hays emphasized that "[flederal officers must deal through and not
around an attorney retained by a defendant under indictment." United States v.
Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
85. In Massiah, the decisive factor was that government "succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements" of a defendant in the absence
of counsel while under indictment. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201 (Stewart, J.,) (emphasis
added). Thus, the main consideration of Massiah was not whether the government
had interrogated the defendant, but that it had succeeded in listening to his incriminating statements in the absence of counsel. Id.
86. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2616.
87. Rather than conduct a narrow search for the functional equivalent of interrogation, the Court should have looked to the net result of the government's actions
to determine if there had been an interference with the defendant's right to counsel.
See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
88. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1984).
89. Wilson, 106 S.Ct. at 2630.
90. Id.
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a fundamental constitutional right deemed essential to a fair criminal prosecution.
Craig Dow Patton

